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What Role for Humanitarian Intellectual
Property? The Globalization of Intellectual
Property Rights
Susan K. Sell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization of intellectual property rights poses new
challenges in fields ranging from medicine to agriculture. The
dramatic expansion of intellectual property rights threatens
reduced access to life-saving medicines and essential crops.
Even though promising advances in biotechnology may
enhance the nutritional content of basic crops, access to those
critical developments is endangered by current regulatory
trends.
The 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), administered by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), is the most important
international law governing intellectual property rights.1
TRIPS extends patent rights to a wide variety of agricultural
biotechnology innovations, including pharmaceutical products,
pesticides, and plant varieties.2 It establishes a twenty-year
patent term for these innovations.3 TRIPS requires states to
* Susan K. Sell holds a BA from Colorado College, an MA from the
University of California at Santa Barbara, and a PhD from the University of
California at Berkeley. She is Associate Professor of Political Science at the
George Washington University where her teaching and research focuses on
theories of international politics, international political economy and relations
between the North and South.
1. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Intellectual Property, Corporate
Strategy, Globalisation: Trips in Context, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 451, 451 (2002).
2. See United Nations Council on Trade and Development- International
Center for Trade and Sustainable Development Project on Intellectual
Property Rights and Sustainable Development, Intellectual Property Rights:
Implications for Development 77 (2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD-ICTSD Project
on Intellectual Property Rights] (summarizing biotechnology patent protection
under
TRIPS
Article
27.3(b)),
available
at
K.
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/PP/PP_3CH_07.pdf;
SUSAN
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (2003).
3. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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provide adequate and effective enforcement mechanisms both
internally and at their borders.4 The price of information and
technology is increased under TRIPS because monopoly
privileges are extended to patent-holders and TRIPS makes
WTO dispute settlement procedures available to patent holders
claiming violation of intellectually property rights.5 If a
complaining government is successful in its claim, the WTO
can authorize trade sanctions against the violating state.6
These settlement procedures and powers to punish make
TRIPS a real force in the world.
Intellectual property rights reflect an inherent tension
between the strong desire to promote and reward creative
energy and the desire to make the fruits of that creativity
available to the public.7 The granting of exclusive rights must
be balanced against the economic effects of higher product and
transaction costs8 and the potential “exclusion from the market
of competitors who may be able to imitate or adapt the
invention in such a way that social value is increased.”9 Thus,
the question is whether intellectual property rights should be
treated as “a public goods problem for which the remedy is
commodification, or a monopoly of information problem for
which the remedy is unfettered competition[?]”10
Strong intellectual property protection is justified by a
market approach, because such protection provides incentives
to “increase the number of commercially available products and
thereby serve the public interest.”11 However, it is important
to question which public interests these rights serve. In the
context of agricultural biotechnology, stakeholders include
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C; LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND
vol.
31,
33
I.L.M.
81
(1994),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2004).
4. See SELL, supra note 2, at 9.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 15.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 15 (citing MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 250 (1995)).
10. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1450 (1992).
11. Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of
the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 782 (2004) (reviewing DEREK
BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)).
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private sector seed companies, public corporations, research
institutions, and resource-poor farmers.12 Intellectual property
rights holders benefit from exclusive control of their
innovations, as do those who have the resources to gain access
to these innovations via the commercial market. Yet marketbased solutions have failed to serve marginalized populations,
such as the millions of people afflicted with HIV/AIDS and
smallholder subsistence farmers in developing countries. The
fact that smallholder farmers account for seventy-five percent
of the world’s undernourished population is evidence of this
failure.13 In contemporary life science industries, market
mechanisms fail to deliver innovation into the public domain.14
Indeed, “[i]nternational markets for technologies are inherently
subject to failure due to distortions attributable to concerns
about appropriability, problems of valuing information by
buyers and sellers, and market power, all strong justifications
for public intervention at both the domestic and global levels.”15
There is a great need to strike a balance between a patentholder’s exclusive rights and the provision of agricultural
technology to marginalized populations throughout the world.
Solutions that will maximize the benefit of protecting
innovation and yet minimize the risk of harm created by the
potential overextension of this protection must be explored. It
is
therefore
essential
that
policymakers
consider
“humanitarian” policies that promote social goals, such as
protecting public health and alleviating malnutrition.
This paper addresses the appropriateness of patent
protection for agricultural innovations which could provide
extensive benefits to marginalized populations if placed in the
public domain. First, it places global intellectual property
rights into a broader structural context and discusses a number
of issues present in the expansion of agricultural intellectual
12. Cf. UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 2, at 107-08 (discussing the rights of plant breeders and the interests of
farmers).
13. See Robert Lettington, Small-scale Agriculture and the Nutritional
Safeguard under Article 8(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Case Studies from Kenya and
Peru, UNCTAD-ICTSD, Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property
Rights and Sustainable Development 7 (Draft November 2003), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/lettingtonfinaldraft.pdf.
14. See Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 279 (2004).
15. Id. at 288.
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property protection. Second, it focuses on conflicts between
commercial breeders and smallholder subsistence farmers. The
article then examines the current framework of the
international intellectual property rights regime, including a
discussion of TRIPS and The International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), bilateral and
regional free trade agreements, and the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
The discussion next reflects upon the changing role of land
grant universities in transferring the benefits of agricultural
technology. Finally, this paper concludes with policy options
for the future.
II. STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS
The contemporary global intellectual property regime is
embedded in a broad structural context characterized by
asymmetrical power relationships.16 Over the past thirty
years, the globalization of financial markets and the shift
towards an unfettered faith in laissez faire markets ideology
pursued by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations has
resulted in an increase in corporate transnational power vis-àvis the state.17 States, seeking to be globally competitive, have
liberalized markets, engaged in deregulation and privatization,
and implemented new regulatory structures designed to
promote efficiency and enforce market-friendly behavior.18
According to Philip Cerny, “[t]he institutions and practices of
the state itself are increasingly marketized or ‘commodified,’
and the state becomes the spearhead of structural
transformation to international market norms both at home
and abroad.”19 States have increasingly privatized once-public
services, such as prisons, hospitals, military support services
and even “mission-critical” functions, such as providing
protection for the head of the 2003 Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III. The expansion of
intellectual property rights and the privatization of federally
funded research under the Bayh-Dole Act must be seen as an
instance of this larger trend.20
16.
17.
18.
19.

See SELL, supra note 2, at 17.
Id. at 19.
Cf. id. at 19-20.
Philip Cerny, Political Globalization and the Competition State, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 300, 304 (Richard
Stubbs & Geoffrey Underhill eds., 2nd. ed. 2000).
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2001). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 permits
universities to patent inventions resulting from federally funded research.
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These broad economic changes have profoundly affected
developing countries. Earlier models of economic development
such as import-substituting industrialization, popular in Latin
America and India, were discredited by economic stagnation
and the debt crises of the 1970s-1980s.21 Meanwhile, the
success of the East Asian “Tigers” vindicated export-led
development and integration into global markets.22 Many
developing countries subsequently reversed decades-old policies
of economic nationalism in favor of market liberalization and
privatization and consequently slashed public budgets.23
Governments in developing countries began to compete to
attract foreign investment and eased former restrictions of
foreign investors’ activities.24 The new push toward export-led
growth meant that developing countries needed access to
The dependence of
industrialized country markets.25
developing nations on trade gave the United States
considerable economic leverage.26 Those developing countries
sought access to the expansive United States market.27 Using
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,28 the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, at the behest of high-technology firms,
threatened trade sanctions against developing countries unless
they adopted and enforced highly protective intellectual
property policies.29 Such economic coercion was an important
factor behind developing countries’ ultimate acceptance of
TRIPS.30
This liberalizing agenda favors “finance capital and other
Transnational firms in
mobile factors of production.”31
knowledge-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals,
21. See Thomas Biersteker, The “Triumph” of Neo-classical Economics in
the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the
International Economic Order, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT:
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 102, 121-22 (James Rosenau & Otto
Czempiel eds., 1992).
22. Id.
23 . See generally id. at 105-07, 121-26.
24. See generally id.
25 . See generally id.
26 . See generally id.
27. See Biersteker, supra note 21 at 105-07, 121-26.
28. See 19 U.S.C § 2411 (1999).
29. See SELL, supra note 2, at 87-94.
30. See id. at 9, 87-94, 109-11.
31. Andrew Baker, Globalization and the British ‘Residual State’, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 362, 363-64 (Richard
Stubbs & Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 2nd ed. 2000).
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chemicals, software, and entertainment “have the resources,
motivations and capabilities to roam the world searching for
the kind of opportunities that promise lucrative rewards.”32
These privileged sectors participate in “globalized” markets
insofar as “there are a small number of participants who know
one another and operate across countries with a common
conception of control.”33 TRIPS reflects the wishes of these
privileged sectors and globalizes their preferred conception of
control by establishing a high level of protection.
Beyond extending property rights, competitiveness
concerns moved the United States to relax its antitrust
policies.34 The Reagan administration codified this approach in
the Antitrust Division’s Merger Control Guidelines of 1982.35
Reflecting the influence of the Chicago School of Economics, the
new guidelines abandoned the populist focus on market
structure in favor of the Chicago school’s focus on price
theory.36 “In this view, only business practices that reduce
output and increase prices are anti-competitive; business
In
practices that expand output are pro-competitive.”37
contrast to earlier approaches, according to the Chicago school,
“[h]igh levels of market concentration and the exercise of
market power may be indicative of efficiencies.”38 The 1982
guidelines presented an expanded definition of relevant
markets. The guidelines allowed the introduction of nonstructural factors, such as foreign competition or the possession
of new technology that was important to long-term
competitiveness.39 The Justice Department argued that “antitrust laws should not be applied in a way that hinders the
renewed emphasis on . . . competitiveness.”40
This new thinking removed most intellectual property
licensing from antitrust scrutiny. As Thomas Hayslett points
32. Randall Germain, Globalization in Historical Perspective, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS 67, 81 (Randall D. Germain ed., 2000).
33. Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to
Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 663 (1996).
34. See SELL, supra note 2, at 72-74.
35. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS 159 (1998).
36. See id. at 158.
37. Id.
38. MARC EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 105
(1991).
39. See id. at 198.
40. PAUL S. HOFF, INVENTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE: PATENT LICENSING
AND THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (1986).
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out, under Reagan’s administration, “executive agencies viewed
the economic incentives provided by intellectual property rights
as legitimate means of extracting the full economic benefit from
innovation.”41 In effect then, “[i]ntellectual property rights
acted as a ‘magic trump card’ allowing many previously suspect
arrangements to proceed without challenge from the [Federal
Keith
Trade Commission] or [Department of Justice].”42
Maskus and Jerome Reichman suggest that today:
There are virtually no products sold on the general products market
that do not come freighted with a bewildering and overlapping array
of exclusive property rights that discourage follow-on applications of
routine technical know-how. Weak enforcement of antitrust laws then
further reinforces the barriers to entry erected upon this thicket of
rights, while the need to stimulate and coordinate investment in
complex innovation projects justifies patent pools, concentrations of
research efforts, and predatory practices formerly thought to
constitute misuses of the patent monopoly.43

So-called patent “thickets” have proliferated, in which
overlapping patent rights require those seeking to
commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple
patent holders.44 “A growing thicket of rights surrounds gene
fragments, research tools, and other upstream inputs of
scientific research, and the resulting transaction costs impede
and delay research and development undertaken in both the
public and private sectors.”45
III. ISSUES IN AGRICULTURE
What are the implications of the foregoing for agriculture?
“Increasingly . . . [intellectual property] rights have invaded the
research commons itself and made it both costly and difficult to
obtain cutting-edge technologies needed for public health,
agricultural production, environmental protection, and the
provision of other public goods.”46 Critics of the increasing
commodification of what was once treated as the public domain
41. Thomas L. Hayslett III, 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property: Harmonizing the Commercial Use of Legal Monopolies
with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 382 (1996).
42. Id.
43. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 297.
44. Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through
Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1090-91 (2003).
45. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 298. See also Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress
of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
46. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 303-04.
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have raised at least six issues of concern: (1) threats to
traditional agriculture and food security; (2) abuses of
monopoly power; (3) increased dependence on costly
commercial agriculture; (4) threats to biodiversity; (5)
“biopiracy;” and (6) questions of benefit sharing.47
The
discussion in this article focuses on the first three issues of
concern.
Technological, judicial, and legislative changes together
have produced a radical shift from public to private provision of
seeds. As Professor Keith Aoki points out, “[t]he private seed
market for grains was almost nonexistent at the beginning of
the twentieth century, due to free government seed distribution
and the widespread practice of farmer seed saving.”48
According to Professor Aoki, “the intersection of biotechnical
knowledge and methods and expanded legal protections for
plant breeders transforms seed germplasm into a paradigm
commodity.”49 Legislative changes, including the United States
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,50 “increased expectations
of seed industry profits and thereby helped to stimulate an
upsurge in mergers and acquisitions . . . .”51 Life sciences
corporations “emerged out of a wave of mergers, acquisitions,
joint ventures and strategic partnerships involving companies
in a wide range of fields such as chemicals, seeds, processed
foods, dietary supplements and pharmaceuticals.”52 Advances
in biotechnology spurred the consolidation process throughout
The 1973
the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s.53
development of the recombinant DNA technique, “which
enabled foreign genes to be inserted into microorganisms,”
helped launch the era of commercial biotechnology.54 Notably,
although “the Cohen-Boyer method for combining DNA from
different organisms” was patented, “the patents were licensed
nonexclusively and cheaply to encourage firms to take licenses
rather than to challenge the patents.”55 This technology had
47. See, e.g., Lettington, supra note 13, at 33-37.
48. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed
Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 268-69 (2003).
49. Id. at 261.
50. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970).
51. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE
SCIENCES INDUSTRIES 149 (2003).
52. Id. at 147-48.
53. Id. at 148.
54. Id.
55. Rai and Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 300.
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been federally funded, and “[m]any observers attribute the
rapid progress of the biotechnology industry to the fact that
this technology was made widely available rather than licensed
exclusively to a single firm.”56 In 1980, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in Diamond v. Chakrabarty57 that a man-made,
oil-eating bacterium could be patented. This case led to the
expansion of rights to own living organisms and injected
greater certainty into the development of commercial
biotechnology. The ability to acquire patents on altered life
forms helped biotechnology startup companies to raise venture
capital.
The combination of expanded intellectual property rights
and relaxed antitrust enforcement has led to marked economic
concentration in the life sciences industries. The “vertical
integration” of plant breeding, agrochemical, and food
processing corporations has led to a situation in which the top
ten seed companies control thirty percent of the world’s $23
billion commercial seed market.58 Corporate plant breeders are
obtaining broad patents that will have “far reaching”
consequences.59 “Breeders are patenting entire species (cotton),
economic characteristics (oil quality), plant reproductive
behaviour (apomixes), and basic techniques in biotechnology
(gene transfer tools).”60 Six major industrial groups now
control most of the technology “‘which gives freedom to
undertake commercial research and development in the area of
[genetically modified] crops.’ These are (i) Agrevo and Plant
Genetic Systems (PGS); (ii) Du Pont and Pioneer; (iii) ELM,
DNAP, Asgrow and Seminis; (iv) Monsanto, Calgene, DeKalb,
Agracetus, PBI, Hybritech and Delta and Pine Land Co.; (v)
Novartis; and (vi) Zeneca, Mogen and Avanta.”61 Furthermore,
six agricultural biotechnology companies alone hold seventyfive percent of all U.S. patents granted to the top thirty patentholding firms: Monsanto, Du Pont, Syngenta, Dow, Aventis,
This combination of economic
and Grupo Pulsar.62
56. Id.
57. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-18 (1980).
58. GAIA/GRAIN (Genetic Resources Action Council), Intellectual
Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Economic Myths, § 4.2 (1998)
[hereinafter GAIA/GRAIN, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity], at
http://www.grain.org/briefings/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. DUTFIELD, supra note 51, at 170.
62. Id. at 154.
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concentration with extensive and broad patenting means that a
handful of global corporations are making huge inroads toward
control of the world’s food supply and are entangling farmers
and indigenous peoples in an increasingly complex web of
licensing and royalty obligations. As Keith Maskus and
Jerome Reichman suggest:
[T]he natural competitive disadvantages of follower countries may
become reinforced by a proliferation of legal monopolies and related
entry barriers that result from global minimum [intellectual
property] standards. Such external restraints on competition could
consign the poorest countries to a quasi-permanent status at the
bottom of the technology and growth ladder.63

The current system skews research towards rich and
middle-income countries’ markets and sectors.64 Most notably,
there is a tendency in the public health sector to neglect
tropical diseases in favor of focusing on cancer and so-called
lifestyle afflictions, requiring drugs to combat obesity, balding,
and erectile dysfunction. Consequently, only thirteen of 1,233
new drugs marketed between 1975 and 1997 were approved for
As Professor Hammer
tropical diseases in particular.65
suggests, “the rhetoric of strong intellectual property rights
leading to innovation that meets social needs rings particularly
hollow” for poorer countries most afflicted by tropical
diseases.66 Similarly, there is a focus on the interests of
higher-income markets in the agriculture sector, resulting in
the development of crops unsuitable for subsistence and
smallholder farming and a dearth of research beneficial for less
The disproportionate emphasis on
lucrative micro-climates.67
wealthier countries’ market needs can be corrected through
changes in private-public collaboration and through the
allocation of more funding towards “the goal of helping
subsistence farmers.”68 Historically, seed companies preferred
to develop hybrids because farmers must purchase new hybrid
seed every planting season.69 Since the offspring of hybrid
plants do not breed true-to-type, hybrid seeds offer a “form of
63. Maskus and Reichman, supra note 14, at 282.
64. See Lettington, supra note 13, at 51.
65. Peter F. Hammer, Differential Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs:
Markets, Politics, and Public Health, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 883, 888 (2002).
66. Id.
67. See Lettington, supra note 13, at 50-51.
68. John H. Barton, Nutrition and Technology Transfer Policies,
UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable
Development 14-15 (2003), at http://www.iprsonline.
69. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107.
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biological protection.”70 However, for plant varieties that lack
this built-in biological protection, plant breeders can appeal to
plant breeders’ rights. Plant breeders’ rights “generally do not
encourage breeding related to minor crops with small
markets.”71 As a result, the private sector under invests in
crops and technologies suitable for smallholder farmers, and
these public goods are underprovided.
With the advent of genetic engineering, plant breeders
sought to safeguard their investments through strong patent
protections. Depending on national law, patents may be
available for “the use of the new gene to transform a plant, on
the transformation process, and most significantly on the
transformed plant itself.”72 The protection of transgenic plants
enables genetic engineering firms to have “more confidence in
their ability to reap the fruits of their research.”73 That is
because transfer or insertion of the patented gene into other
plants constitutes patent infringement.74 Before the adoption
of the 1991 Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV91), plant breeders were forced to choose to protect their
plant varieties with either a plant breeders’ right or a patent.
However, UPOV91 “removed the 1978 [UPOV’s] ban on dual
protection and now permits member states to protect the same
plant variety with both a breeders’ right and a patent.”75
Professor Robert Lettington argues that this expansion of
intellectual property rights into the agricultural sector has
threatened the public sector’s traditional focus on the needs of
smallholder farmers.76 First of all, “private sector intellectual
property rights may limit public sector access to innovations
and germplasm that may be adaptable to smallholder needs
and conditions while also limiting public sector research
options due to concerns over the unhindered distribution of the
products of its research.”77 Second, the “failure of intellectual
property systems to preserve the integrity of the public domain,
70. Barton, supra note 68, at 10.
71. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 106.
72. Barton, supra note 68, at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Laurence R. Helfer, Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: An
Overview With Options for National Governments 15, (FAO Legal Papers
Online No. 31, 2002), at http://www.fao.org/Legal/prs-ol/lpo31-2.pdf (emphasis
added).
76. Lettington, supra note 13, at 8.
77. Id.
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and the consequent development of intellectual property rights
strategies in public institutions, risks distorting research
priorities to the detriment of smallholder farmers.”78
In developing countries, a large number of farmers are
smallholders who do not participate in the transgenic seed
market in any substantial way.79 Instead, these farmers
engage in seed-saving, replanting, and “across-the-fence”
exchange.80 This is particularly the case in many African
countries where the public and private sectors play a minimal
role in seed production and distribution.81 The smallholder
farming sector plays an important role in contributing to
national food needs. For example, such farmers produce “fiftyone percent of Latin America’s maize, seventy-seven percent of
its beans and sixty-one percent of its potatoes.”82 In Africa,
smallholder farmers produce the “majority of grains and
legumes and almost all root, tuber and plantain crops.”83
Furthermore, fifty to sixty percent of Peruvians and seventy to
eighty percent of Kenyans depend on smallholder agriculture
for their livelihood. 84
According to Professor Lettington, subsistence farmers
traditionally save seeds for reuse, trade, and experimentation
with new hybrids.85 Such experimentation contributes to the
planet’s biodiversity, as evidenced by the farmers in Professor
Lettington’s study who produced “as many as [thirty or forty]
distinct varieties of potato, and [five or ten varieties] of maize,
on farms of little more than a hectare.”86 In the past, American
laws covering plant varieties incorporated the notion of
farmers’ rights in which farmers retained their freedom to
engage in these important and traditional activities.87
However, in August 1994 the U.S. Congress amended the Plant
Variety Protection Act and removed the farmer’s exemption.88
As a result, “it is now expressly illegal for farmers to sell or
78. Id.
79. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107; Barton, supra note 68, at 6.
80. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107.
81. Id.
82. Lettington, supra note 13, at 13.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id.
87. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107.
88. Pub. L. No. 103-349, § 10, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142 (1994) (amending 7
U.S.C. § 2543).
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save seeds from proprietary crop varieties without receiving
permission from breeders and paying royalties.”89 Ironically,
according to Professor Aoki, while the U.S. Patent Office in the
“early 19th century began to collect and catalogue and make”
seed freely available, by the early twenty-first century, the
commodification of germplasm had transformed the U.S. patent
office, into a “primary means” of attacking the longstanding
“practice of farmer seed-saving.”90 Grassroots activists are
convinced that American industries are seeking these same
results through TRIPS by pushing a particular interpretation
of sui generis protection under Article 27.3(b).91
Ultimately, TRIPS restricted the patenting of life forms,
but Article 27.3(b) requires that members provide intellectual
property protection for plant varieties or an “effective sui
generis” system.92 However, there really is no consensus on
what a sui generis system needs to include. Additionally, the
negotiations leading to the adoption of Article 27 provide little
guidance because they provide no record on the meaning of sui
generis.93 American plant breeders have been pushing the
UPOV as the model sui generis system. American support of
UPOV may be due in part to how generous UPOV is to the
corporate plant breeder.94 Fifty-one countries, many of which
are industrialized, have joined the UPOV, which was last
amended in 1991.95 The 1978 version of UPOV provided two
limitations on the monopoly rights of plant breeders.96 First,
other breeders could freely use UPOV-protected varieties for
research purposes.97 Second, farmers could reuse the seed for

89. SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE 90 (1999).
90. Aoki, supra note 48, at 331.
91. See GAIA/GRAIN, Signposts to Sui Generis Rights: The International
Context
of
the
Sui
Generis
Debate,
§
1.1.1
(1998),
at
http://www.grain.org/briefings/?=173. id/gtbc/issue3.html.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Johanna Sutherland, TRIPS, Cultural Politics and Law Reform, in 16
PROMETHEUS 291, 295 (1998).
94. See GAIA/GRAIN, UPOV on the War Path (June 1998) [hereinafter
GAIA/GRAIN, UPOV on the War Path], at http://www.grain.org/briefings/.
95. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2 1961, as amended on Mar. 19, 1991 (listing the states party to
the
convention
as
of
Oct.
24,
2002),
available
at
http://www.upov.int/en/publications/gazette/pdf/pub422_24-10-02.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2004).
96. GAIA/GRAIN, UPOV on the War Path, supra note 94.
97. See id.
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the following year’s harvest under certain conditions.98 The
1991 revision narrowed down the exemption for competing
breeders, deleted the so-called farmers’ privilege, and extended
the breeders’’ monopoly right to the products of the farmer’s
“Although the UPOV system allows on-farm
harvest.99
replanting, its rules restrict farmers’ freedom to buy seed from
sources other than the original breeders.”100 UPOV91 “does not
authorize farmers to sell or exchange seeds with other farmers
for propagating purposes.”101 To join UPOV today, nations
must sign the 1991 treaty.102 Countries eschewing the UPOV
system can adopt sui generis systems of protection that allow
“farmers to acquire . . . protected seed from any source and/or
requiring protected varieties to display qualities that are
genuinely superior to existing varieties.”103
In a comparative study of smallholder farming in Peru and
Kenya, Robert J. L. Lettington did not find evidence that plant
variety protection (PVP) legislation harmed smallholder
agriculture.104 However, he argued that “the current system of
PVP [legislation] is failing to create solutions to existing
In particular, PVP legislation has created
problems.”105
incentives that direct resources away from subsistence farmers’
needs in favor of those of large commercial agricultural
enterprises.106 It also promotes the use of commercial seed as
opposed to landraces or “wild” cultivars.107 “The end result has
been a hastening of the deterioration of food security in these
areas . . . .”108 Professor Lettington suggests that governments
that seek to limit the cost of seed in economically and
climatically marginal areas may “need to place limits on the
nature of intellectual property rights.”109

98. See id.
99. See id.
100. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107.
101. Helfer, supra note 75, at 17 (citing J. Watal, Intellectual Property
Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, KLUWER L. INT’L. 141 (2000)).
102. GAIA/GRAIN, UPOV on the War Path, supra note 94.
103. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 2, at 107.
104. See Lettington, supra note 13, at 32.
105. See id.
106. See generally GAIA/GRAIN, UPOV on the War Path, supra note 94.
107. See generally id.; Lettington, supra note 13, at 34.
108. Lettington, supra note 13, at 34.
109. Id.
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IV. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
In examining the regulatory environment in this context,
the central question is what degree of discretion states have in
limiting intellectual property rights to support smallholder
agriculture. There are at least two dimensions to the answer:
one addresses the letter of the law, the other addresses the
broader context of asymmetrical power. Focusing on the formal
features of intellectual property law, texts, and institutions,
one sees plenty of room for state discretion and flexibility in
adapting the global minimum standards to local concerns.110
However, this formal universe is embedded in a system of
asymmetrical power relationships and global capitalism that
constrain weaker states’ abilities to exploit the flexibilities
crafted into the law.111
TRIPS provides substantial flexibility for developing
countries.112 Article 27.3(b) specifies that countries may adopt
an “effective sui generis system” to protect plant varieties.113
Under TRIPS, countries may adopt patent protection for plant
varieties, UPOV91, an alternative sui generis system, or some
combination of these forms of protection.114 While corporate
plant breeders would prefer that developing countries adopt
UPOV91 as their domestic legislative standard, these countries
are by no means required to do so.115 The UPOV treaties are
one type of sui generis protection designed to serve the
interests of plant breeders. In a searching and thorough
analysis of developing countries’ options, Professor Laurence
Helfer has arrayed the options on a spectrum ranging from
maximum discretion to minimal discretion for developing
countries to tailor their systems to meet their particular
needs.116 States that adopt TRIPS and ratify or accede to
UPOV91 have the least discretion.117 According to Professor
110. See id. at 32.
111. See generally id. at 32-34; SOUTH CENTRE/CIEL IP, QUARTERLY
UPDATE: FIRST QUARTER 2004, FIRST QUARTER 2004: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL FORA,
available
at
http://www.southcentre.org/info/sccielipquarterly/ipdev2004q1.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter South Centre].
112. See Helfer, supra note 75, at 23.
113. Id. at 22.
114. See id. at 23.
115. See generally id. at 22.
116. See id. at 34-47.
117. See id. at 37.
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Helfer, states wishing to retain maximum flexibility and
discretion to serve the needs of smallholder agriculture would
be well-advised to adopt TRIPS only.118
The advantages of TRIPS are that its provisions on plant
varieties “do not refer to or incorporate any preexisting
intellectual property agreements, including the 1978 and 1991
UPOV Acts.”119 TRIPS members are neither required “to
become members of UPOV nor to enact national laws
consistent with either UPOV Act in order to comply with their
Article 27.3(b) preserves
obligations under TRIP[S].”120
“significant leeway for national governments to work out the
precise manner in which they will balance protection of IPRs
against other international obligations and national
objectives.”121 “The chances are, that for a poor nation, neither
a UPOV nor a regular patent approach will actually encourage
private-sector research. Hence, such a nation is probably bestoff adopting minimum compliance with TRIPS . . . .”122 TRIPS,
unlike UPOV91, preserves the right of subsistence farmers to
exchange seed.123 For a nation in which the exchange is an
issue, it would be wise to incorporate both subsistence farmer
exemptions and research exemptions in national plant
breeders’ rights legislation.124 Countries wishing to adopt the
stronger UPOV91 system should consider incorporating
waivers or exemptions for subsistence and smallholder
farmers.125 In countries lacking significant private sector
competition, as is often the case in poor countries, public sector
seed provision will be important to promote competition to
stimulate both variety and lower prices.126
Public-private partnerships in agriculture might stimulate
the transfer of technology so that public sector seed providers
could adapt technology to subsistence farmers’ needs.127 In
order for such arrangements to work, private firms would need
to retain opportunities to capture economic benefits in the
market sector, while keeping the technology affordable for the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Helfer, supra note 13, at 39-46.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Barton, supra note 68, at 11.
See id. at 15, 19-20.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 23-24.
See id. at 12, 14.
See id. at 15.
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subsistence sector.128 This two-tiered arrangement has some
parallels in the control of access to medicines and would
require safeguards against diverting subsistence-priced
technology into the market sector.129
Focusing on TRIPS and the letter of the law, one can
conclude, as does Professor Helfer, that:
States that implement the four core TRIP[S] requirements in good
faith – that is, states that grant breeders intellectual property rights
and enforcement measures applicable to varieties in all species and
botanical genera and that provide those same rights and measures to
breeders from other TRIP[S] member states – are unlikely to have
their laws challenged successfully.130

However, public international law such as TRIPS is
embedded in a broader context of asymmetrical power
relationships between developed and developing countries, and
between producers and consumers of the fruits of
biotechnology. This context reduces the amount of leeway that
poor states have in devising regulatory approaches most
suitable for their individual needs and stages of
In particular, developing countries
development.131
increasingly have been subject to bilateral and regional
pressure to surrender the flexibilities afforded by TRIPS.132
Bilateral investment treaties, bilateral intellectual property
agreements, and regional free trade agreements concluded
between the United States and developing countries and
between the European Union and developing countries
invariably have been considered to be “TRIPS-Plus.”133 For
example, in the intellectual property provisions covering
agriculture in the Central American Free Trade Agreement
framework, developing countries are most often required to
ratify or accede to UPOV91 as their sui generis system of
protection and “to undertake ‘all reasonable efforts’ to make
patent protection available for plants.”134
Furthermore, developing countries have failed to take full
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities not only in the agricultural
marketplace, but the pharmaceutical market as well. This is
128. See Barton, supra note 68, at 15.
129. See id.
130. Helfer, supra note 75, at 34.
131. See generally Lettington, supra note 13, at 32-34; South Centre, supra
note 111, at 1.
132. See generally South Centre, supra note 111, at 12.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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largely because such nations are eager to attract foreign
investment and are concerned about alienating potential
investors.135 They also are eager to have access to technologies
that may aid in their development, provide reliable nutrition,
and which have the potential to address a myriad of pressing
social and economic problems.136 Most of these countries lack
significant bargaining leverage and the capacity to resist the
high-pressure tactics of the United States Trade
Representative and the industries that it represents.137
In these circumstances it is imperative that public
institutions take the lead in assisting developing countries in
the implementation of suitable legislation that conforms to
their international legal obligations. Public institutions, such
as land grant universities, must also continue to make the
fruits of their research available to those who need it most on
terms that the recipients accept. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act
allowed “grantees to seek patent rights in governmentsponsored research results.”138 The idea behind this was that
many inventions with commercial potential lay fallow in
university laboratories, and that patenting opportunities would
give universities incentives to search research labs for
significant and marketable inventions.139 The Bayh-Dole Act
has resulted in at least a ten-fold increase of university
patenting activity since 1979.140 This flurry of patenting
activity has had the beneficial effect of generating revenue for
cash-strapped public universities. For instance, the patent
infringement award that the University of Minnesota won for
the development of the drug Ziagen has provided much-needed
funding for research and graduate student support.141
University patent portfolios also help to attract private sector
funding, especially in biotechnology.142
However, the Bayh-Dole Act also has created new divisions
135. See generally GAIA/GRAIN, Intellectual Property Rights and
Biodiversity, supra note 58
136. See generally GAIA/GRAIN, Signposts to Sui Generis Rights: The
International Context of the Sui Generis Debate, (1998), at
http://www.grain.org/briefings/?=173. id/gtbc/issue3.html.
137. See generally id.
138. Rai and Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 290.
139. See Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 771.
140. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 292.
141. See University of Minnesota Board of Regents Minutes (Oct. 8, 1999),
available at http://www1.umn.edu/regents/minutes/1999/october/board.html.
142. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45,at 303.
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within universities. As Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca
Eisenberg point out, the legislation makes no distinction
between upstream and downstream research, and as a result,
an increasing number of research tools have become patentprotected.143 An unintended consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act
has been the dramatic reduction of open access to research
tools.144 Technology transfer offices are charged with patenting
and licensing technology to generate revenue for the
institution. Research scientists are more interested in having
access to “open science.”145 The Bayh-Dole Act also has
increased university collaboration with private sector
biotechnology firms, raising many questions about academic
freedom, research priorities, and incentives.146 Some critics
have gone so far as to assert that universities have lost their
sense of “public mission.”147
Yet the choices may not be so stark, and there may be ways
to navigate the contours of the current system to better balance
competing imperatives. For example, in the pharmaceutical
sector, there could be clauses in agreements to allow a
university to sublicense to generic manufacturers if its patent
conflicts with efforts to distribute affordable drugs for
HIV/AIDS victims in sub-Saharan Africa.148 Professors Rai
and Eisenberg offer a similarly modest and sensible suggestion
for publicly-funded research. They suggest that “decisions
about the dividing line between the public domain and private
property should be made by institutions that are in a position
to appreciate the tensions between widespread access and
preservation of commercial incentives without being unduly
swayed by institutional interests that diverge from the overall
public interest.”149 In other words, they argue that public
funding agencies should decide what fruits of their investments
They also advocate addressing the
to patent.150
upstream/downstream research tool issue by devising “a
system that distinguishes cases in which proprietary claims
143. See id. at 290-91.
144. See id. at 294.
145. See id. at 305.
146. See id. at 304.
147. Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 789.
148. See, e.g., Michael A. Friedman, Henk den Besten & Amir Attaran,
Out-Licensing: A Practical Approach for Improvement of Access to Medicines in
Poor Countries, 361 THE LANCET 341 (2003).
149. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 303.
150. See id.
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make sense from cases in which they do not.”151 Research tool
exemptions would be useful to help to preserve the domain of
“open science.”
V. CONCLUSION
This brief overview of some major issues involved in
intellectual property protection and agricultural biotechnology
underscores the fact that “the institution of property is
extremely complex, and more importantly, political.”152 Yet we
are no closer to resolving these controversies. “More often than
not, rather than being an answer, the issue of property rights is
only the beginning of a long series of vexing questions.”153
Developing countries should do what they can to preserve their
autonomy in adopting intellectual property policies that suit
their levels of development. They should resist TRIPS-plus
initiatives in bilateral and regional trade and investment
agreements and insist upon TRIPS as their maximum
standard. Developing nations should seek technical assistance
that encourages them to use existing TRIPS flexibilities. They
also need to participate in global standard-setting exercises
concerning competition policy and address the ways in which
they would prefer to regulate foreign firms’’ acquisition of local
firms.154
Promoting genuine competition is an important policy
objective. “Nations in which there is limited private sector
competition in the seed industry should ensure that public
sector varieties are available in competition with private sector
ones.”155 Professor Lettington recommends:
The activities of smallholder farmers, in particular the saving, use,
exchange, and sale of farm-saved seed, should be explicitly stated as
not subject to the rights of intellectual property rights holders. In
accordance with the purposes and objectives of TRIPS, effort should
be made to develop effective incentives for research targeted at
smallholder farmers...... . Limited exceptions to intellectual property
rights should be permitted to promote the adaptation of protected
products to the needs of smallholder farmers. These should apply to
both research and development and to manufacturing and
151. Id.
152. Aoki, supra note 48, at 317.
153. Id. (citing Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights
& Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition
of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1998)).
154. See Barton, supra note 68, at 13.
155. Id.
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distribution.156

Universities may feel caught between the conflicting
imperatives of attracting private sector funding and generating
revenue through patenting activity on the one hand, and
promoting public goods through “humanitarian intellectual
property” policies on the other. It is clear that universities
have an important role to play in preserving the balance
between exclusion and access as well as paving the way to more
informed, effective, and socially responsible agricultural
intellectual property policies.

156. Lettington, supra note 13, at 8.

